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I. INTRODUCTION 
When you hear the term sex offender, what kind of a person comes 
to mind?  Let me guess:  An eighteen-year-old high school senior with great 
grades and a talent for cheerleading, basketball, and chorus.
1
  Not what you 
had in mind?  Well, in February of this year, Kaitlyn Hunt, an eighteen-year-
old Florida high school student with the attributes listed above, was expelled 
from her high school and was charged with “two counts of lewd and 
lascivious battery of a child [twelve] to [sixteen] years of age.”2 
Kaitlyn and her younger girlfriend met at Sebastian River High 
School in Sebastian, Florida.
3
  Kaitlyn was an eighteen-year-old senior, and 
her girlfriend was a fourteen-year-old freshman at the high school.
4
  There 
was a three year and seven month age difference between the two partners, 
which—as you will soon learn—will be a crucial piece of information in 
determining Kaitlyn’s future sentence.5 
The couple played on the school basketball team and socialized with 
the same circle of friends.
6
  While dating, they engaged in sexual acts 
multiple times before the younger girlfriend’s parents discovered their 
                                                                    
1. Stacey Barchenger, Support Grows for Student Expelled over Same-Sex 
‘Love’, USA TODAY (May 21, 2013, 4:57 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2013/05/21/student-expelled-same-sex-relationship/2345157/. 
2. Stephanie Slifer, Kaitlyn Hunt Update:  Fla. Teen Charged over Same-Sex 
Underage Relationship Speaks Out, CBS NEWS (May 23, 2013, 11:26 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-57585885-504083/kaitlyn-hunt-update-fla-teen-
charged-over-same-sex-underage-relationship-speaks-out/. 
3. Jason Parsley, When Did High School Senior Kaitlyn Hunt Meet Her 
Freshman Girlfriend?, SFGN (June 1, 2013), http://www.southfloridagaynews.com/when-did-
high-school-senior-kaitlyn-hunt-meet-her-freshman-girlfriend/122918; Slifer, supra note 2. 
4. Parsley, supra note 3. 
5. Id.; see discussion infra Parts II.B., VI.B.2. 
6. Slifer, supra note 2. 
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relationship.
7
  Once they learned their daughter was dating a girl about three-
and-a-half years older than her, they promptly contacted the police to report 
Kaitlyn.
8
  After rejecting a plea deal that would have sentenced her to two 
years house arrest and one year of probation, Kaitlyn now faces up to fifteen 
years in prison, and may be required to register as a sex offender.
9
 
There is no question as to the importance of statutory rape laws.
10
  
Young teenagers are at risk of being taken advantage of by older individuals 
and they absolutely deserve the legal protection that statutory rape laws 
provide.
11
  Offenders of said laws are usually given lengthy prison 
sentences
12
 and are required to register as sex offenders upon their release.
13
  
However, despite the importance of statutory rape laws it is worth 
questioning whether some of the acts punishable by statutory rape laws—
sexual activity between two otherwise consenting teenagers—are acts that 
should result in such crippling consequences.
14
 
This Comment will analyze whether Florida’s statutory rape laws are 
too harsh on teenage offenders, and whether or not its Romeo and Juliet 
law—a law used to negate the sex offender registration requirement for 
teenage offenders—does enough to protect teenagers from the life-changing 
consequences of being found guilty of statutory rape. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF STATUTORY RAPE LAW 
A. Statutory Rape Laws:  Beginnings 
Statutory rape laws criminalize sexual activity with persons who are 
not yet old enough to legally give consent for sex.
15
  Such laws have been 
enforced in English law for over seven hundred years.
16
  England’s first 
                                                                    
7. Carlos Harrison, Florida Student, 18, Gets Online Support After Her 
Arrest for Sex With Girlfriend, 14, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2013, at A20. 
8. Id. 
9. Barchenger, supra note 1; Parsley, supra note 3. 
10. See Steve James, Comment, Romeo and Juliet Were Sex Offenders:  An 
Analysis of the Age of Consent and a Call for Reform, 78 UMKC L. REV. 241, 245–46 (2009). 
11. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 775.21, 794.05, 800.04, 943.04354 (2013). 
12. See FLA. STAT. §§ 775.21, 794.05, 800.04; see also id. § 775.082. 
13. Id. § 775.21(6). 
14. See Barchenger, supra note 1; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 800.04(5)(c)–(d). 
15. Emily J. Stine, Comment, When Yes Means No, Legally:  An Eighth 
Amendment Challenge to Classifying Consenting Teenagers as Sex Offenders, 60 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1169, 1183 (2011) (describing the intent of Romeo and Juliet laws and why they were 
enacted by some states). 
16. Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women:  Re-Evaluating Modern 
Statutory Rape Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 24 (1994) (providing a brief historical 
overview of statutory rape laws). 
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statutory rape law—put into effect in 1275—prohibited children under the 
age of twelve from consenting to sex.
17
  At this time, women were 
considered to be chattel.
18
  Their family would marry them off to another 
family’s son for a bride price.19  Chastity was of significant monetary value 
and a woman’s parents would receive a greater bride price if their daughter 
was chaste at the time she was sold.
20
  For this reason, statutory rape was 
originally considered to be a property crime.
21
  These laws were later 
adopted into American law and they continue to be the foundation of modern 
day statutory rape laws in America.
22
  Statutory rape is considered a strict 
liability offense, eliminating consent as a viable defense.
23
  At the beginning 
of the twentieth century, however, states began to raise the age of consent to 
as high as twenty-one in order to prevent young women from engaging in 
non-marital intercourse.
24
 
B. Age Discrepancy Considerations in Statutory Rape Law 
Originally, the age of the perpetrator had no impact on the severity 
of a punishment for statutory rape because the offender’s age was not 
considered to be an element of the crime.
25
  This led to a failure in 
differentiating between sexual acts amongst peers and sexual exploitation of 
young females by older men.
26
  This is different today; some states take into 
consideration the difference in age between the alleged victim and the 
alleged perpetrator when determining the punishment for statutory rape.
27
 
                                                                    
17. Id.; Anthony M. Amelio, Note, Florida’s Statutory Rape Law:  A Shield 
or a Weapon?—A Minor’s Right of Privacy Under Florida Statutes § 794.05, 26 STETSON L. 
REV. 407, 410 (1996) (providing a historical overview of statutory rape laws). 
18. Rita Eidson, Comment, The Constitutionality of Statutory Rape Laws, 27 
UCLA L. REV. 757, 767 (1980) (explaining the method in which women were once bought 
and sold in marriage). 
19. Id. 
20. See id. 
21. Id. 
22. James, supra note 10, at 245 (providing historical context for statutory 
rape laws). 
23. Amelio, supra note 17, at 410 (explaining how statutory rape laws were 
adopted into the U.S. legal system). 
24. Eidson, supra note 18, at 762–63 (describing how statutory rape laws 
were written at the turn of the twentieth century). 
25. Amelio, supra note 17, at 410 (providing a historical overview of statutory 
rape laws). 
26. Id. at 410–11. 
27. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 794.05 (2013). 
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C. Statutory Rape Laws Today 
There have obviously been significant changes in how women have 
been treated since 1275,
28
 but statutory rape laws are still being enforced 
today.
29
  Instead of protecting women as if they were just a piece of 
property,
30
 statutory rape laws now serve to “‘protect young people from 
coerced sexuality activity; enforce morality; prevent teen pregnancy; and 
reduce welfare dependence.’”31  Florida has two statutory rape laws:  
Sections 794.05
32
 and 800.04 of the Florida Statutes.
33
  Section 794.05 
prohibits a person twenty-four years of age or older from engaging in sexual 
activity with a person between the ages of sixteen and seventeen.
34
  Section 
800.04 prohibits any sexual activity whatsoever with a person between the 
ages of twelve and sixteen.
35
 
Some states have also chosen to put Romeo and Juliet laws into 
effect.
36
  These laws are meant to lessen the punishment of teenage offenders 
under section 800.04 of the Florida Statutes so that they are not punished in 
the exact same manner as adult offenders.
37
  When teenage offenders apply 
for protection under Romeo and Juliet laws, their prison sentences can be 
reduced and their sex offender registration requirement can be dismissed as 
well.
38
 
D. Gender Discrimination in Statutory Rape Law 
Originally, only men could be found guilty of statutory rape.
39
  
Women were viewed as property in need of legal protection.
40
  Despite our 
ever-evolving societal views, however, some statutory rape laws still 
discriminate based on the minor’s gender.41 
                                                                    
28. See Oberman, supra note 16, at 24. 
29. See FLA. STAT. §§ 794.05, 800.04. 
30. James, supra note 10, at 245. 
31. Id. at 246 (explaining the intent behind statutory rape laws). 
32. FLA. STAT. § 794.05. 
33. Id. § 800.04. 
34. Id. § 794.05(1). 
35. Id. § 800.04(4)(a). 
36. Stine, supra note 15, at 1184. 
37. See FLA. STAT. § 943.04354. 
38. See State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 24 (Kan. 2005). 
39. Eidson, supra note 18, at 760–61 (describing the rationale for statutory 
rape laws). 
40. Oberman, supra note 16, at 25 (providing a brief history of statutory rape 
laws). 
41. James, supra note 10, at 252 (explaining that age of consent laws can 
lawfully discriminate based on a person’s gender). 
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In 1981, the Supreme Court of the United States in Michael M. v. 
Superior Court of Sonoma County
42
 questioned the constitutionality of such 
gender-based laws.
43
  In this case, the defendant, a seventeen-year-old male, 
challenged California’s rape law, arguing that the law was unconstitutional 
because it discriminated on the basis of gender.
44
  The Court disagreed and 
upheld the constitutionality of California’s statutory rape law despite the fact 
that the law only allowed men to be held criminally liable.
45
  The Court 
reasoned that a statute will be upheld “where the gender classification is not 
invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not 
similarly situated in certain circumstances.”46 
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, admitted that “[c]ommon sense . . . 
suggests . . . gender-neutral statutory rape law[s] [would be] a greater 
deterrent of sexual activity” among minors because the laws would apply to 
more individuals.
47
  Currently, many states have chosen to use a common 
sense approach and now include gender-neutral language in their statutory 
rape laws to allow for the protection, as well as the punishment, of both 
males and females.
48
 
III. SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN ADOLESCENTS 
Among U.S. high school students, 46% have had sexual intercourse 
at some point.
49
  Additionally, “[m]ore than 400,000 teen[age women] aged 
[fifteen to nineteen] . . . gave birth in 2009.”50  Moreover, the likelihood of a 
teenager having sex in his or her freshman year of high school is 31.6%, 
while the likelihood of a teenager having sex in his or her senior year of high 
school is a whopping 62.3%.
51
 
                                                                    
42. 450 U.S. 464 (1981). 
43. Id. at 466. 
44. Id. at 466–67. 
45. Id. at 467. 
46. Id. at 469. 
47. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 493–94 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
48. See id.; Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape:  A Feminist Critique of Rights 
Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 387, 404 (1984). 
49. 59 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., NO. SS–5, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT: YOUTH RISK 
BEHAVIOR SURVEILLANCE—UNITED STATES, 2009 20 (2010), available at http://
www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/ss/ss5905.pdf. 
50. Sexual Risk Behavior:  HIV, STD, & Teen Pregnancy Prevention, CDC, 
http://www.cdc.gov/HealthyYouth/sexualbehaviors/ (last updated Aug. 26, 2013). 
51. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., supra note 49, at 20. 
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Florida high school statistics show similar trends.
52
  According to the 
Florida Department of Health, which polled 6212 high school students in 
seventy-eight different Florida high schools in 2011, 48.2% of Florida high 
school students had sexual intercourse.
53
  In fact, 7.6% of high school 
students had sexual intercourse for the first time before they reached the age 
of thirteen.
54
  Of the students polled, 43.4% had also participated in oral sex, 
which—as you will soon learn—is also prohibited under Florida’s statutory 
rape laws.
55
 
These statistics are not all that surprising when you consider how 
much sexual content teenagers are being exposed to.
56
  These teenagers are 
more vulnerable to such content than adults because the exposure occurs 
during a period in which sexual attitudes and behaviors are being 
developed.
57
  Statistics show that teenagers who frequently watch 
television—which are many, since the average high school student has 2.9 
televisions in his or her house—“see 143 incidents of sexual behavior on 
network television . . . each week.”58  Shockingly, “80% of all movies shown 
on network or cable television [includes] sexual content.”59  There is no 
doubt that such television content has had an impact on how teenagers view 
and understand sex, as 80% of teenagers reported that they or their peers 
have learned about sex from watching television or movies.
60
 
                                                                    
52. Compare id., with FLA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, SEXUAL BEHAVIORS AMONG 
FLORIDA PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS:  RESULTS FROM THE 2011 FLORIDA YOUTH RISK 
BEHAVIOR SURVEY 1 (n.d.), available at http://www.floridahealth.gov/reports-and-data/
survey-data/youth-risk-surveys/youth-risk-behavior-survey/reports/2011/_documents/sex-
behavior.pdf#search=%22sexual%20behaviors%20among%20high%20school%20students%2
2. 
53. FLA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 52. 
54. Id. 
55. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 800.04(1)(a) (2013). 
56. See Enid Gruber & Joel W. Grube, Adolescent Sexuality and the Media:  
A Review of Current Knowledge and Implications, 172 W.J. MED. 210, 211 (2000), available 
at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1070813/pdf/wjm17200210.pdf (providing 
statistics about sexuality in the media). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
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IV. FLORIDA STATUTES § 800.04—LEWD AND LASCIVIOUS BATTERY ON 
A CHILD TWELVE TO SIXTEEN YEARS OF AGE 
A. Definitions in Florida Statutes § 800.04 
1. Sexual Activity 
“‘Sexual activity’ means the oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or 
union with, the sexual organ of another or the anal or vaginal penetration of 
another by any other object; however, sexual activity does not include an act 
done for a bona fide medical purpose.”61 
In Burnett v. State,
62
 the First District Court of Appeal held that the 
defendant was not guilty of lewd and lascivious battery towards a minor 
when he engaged in inappropriate activities involving pornographic films 
with minors and did not participate in any physical sexual acts.
63
 
In this case, there was evidence that the defendant had watched adult 
pornography with at least two minors.
64
  The defendant was charged and 
found guilty of two counts of lewd and lascivious conduct, which he 
appealed.
65
  The defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal arguing that 
there was no evidence that he actually participated in any kind of physical 
sexual act with the minors.
66
  The appellate court agreed, holding that 
because there was no evidence of the defendant committing a lewd and 
lascivious act on the minors, he could not be found guilty under section 
800.04(4) of the Florida Statutes.
67
 
2. Consent 
“‘Consent’ means intelligent, knowing, and voluntary consent, and 
does not include submission by coercion.”68  Supporters of statutory rape 
laws argue that sexual activity between two people, regardless of how close 
in age both parties may be, cannot be considered consensual if one party is 
below the age of consent.
69
  Opponents of statutory rape laws, however, 
argue that these laws—many times—punish teenagers who are engaging in 
what would otherwise be considered—if not for their young age—wholly 
                                                                    
61. FLA. STAT. § 800.04(1)(a) (2013). 
62. 737 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (per curiam). 
63. Id. at 1107. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Burnett, 737 So. 2d at 1107; see also FLA. STAT. § 800.04(4) (2013). 
68. FLA. STAT. § 800.04(1)(b). 
69. Stine, supra note 15, at 1183. 
8
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consensual sex.
70
  Proponents of statutory rape laws have argued that acts 
that would legally be classified as consensual sex are—in reality—not 
wholly consensual when dealing with teenage girls, due to manipulation by 
older adults.
71
 
Michelle Oberman—in her law review article titled Turning Girls 
into Women:  Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law—discusses 
Antioch College and the college’s attempt to create a system that would 
assure consensual sex.
72
  In this system, one partner would ask the other for 
verbal consent for each separate act of intimacy.
73
  This method was 
criticized for “tak[ing] all the fun out of sex,” which in Oberman’s opinion, 
“provides ample evidence of the entrenchment of the hazy spectrum that 
separates consensual sex from rape.”74  Consent is clearly a major element in 
sexual relationships, yet it is overlooked in statutory rape cases due to the 
language of these laws, which strictly prohibits minors from being able to 
give such consent.
75
 
3. Coercion 
“‘Coercion’ means the use of exploitation, bribes, threats of force, or 
intimidation to gain cooperation or compliance.”76  In her article, Oberman 
explains that despite the intent of statutory rape laws, which is to protect 
teenage girls who are at risk of being coerced into having sex, the teenage 
girls’ vulnerabilities are overlooked.77  Instead, statutory rape laws require 
courts to focus simply on the age differences between the parties.
78
 
4. Victim 
“‘Victim’ means a person upon whom an offense described in this 
section was committed or attempted or a person who has reported a violation 
of this section to a law enforcement officer.”79  The common perception of a 
                                                                    
70. Id. at 1183–84. 
71. Oberman, supra note 16, at 70 (pointing out the short-sightedness of 
statutory rape laws when dealing with teenage girls who can be easily manipulated). 
72. Id. at 71 (explaining the increasing difficulty of differentiating between 
permissible and impermissible sexual encounters). 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 42; see also, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 800.04(2) (2013). 
76. FLA. STAT. § 800.04(1)(c). 
77. Oberman, supra note 16, at 42 (arguing that the vulnerability of teenage 
women is overlooked in statutory rape laws). 
78. Id. 
79. FLA. STAT. § 800.04(1)(d). 
9
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victim—which usually involves an individual being hurt or injured—may not 
always apply in statutory rape cases; a minor in a sexual relationship—
regardless of how honest and consensual such a relationship may be—is 
considered a victim.
80
 
B. The Text of Florida Statutes § 800.04 
Section 800.04 states, “[n]either the victim’s lack of chastity nor the 
victim’s consent is a defense to the crimes proscribed by this section.”81  The 
statute also says, “[t]he perpetrator’s ignorance of the victim’s age, the 
victim’s misrepresentation of his or her age, or the perpetrator’s bona fide 
belief of the victim’s age cannot be raised as a defense in a prosecution under 
this section.”82  Lewd or lascivious battery—the charge that Kaitlyn is 
currently being charged with—occurs when: 
A person . . . [e]ngages in sexual activity with a person [twelve] 
years of age or older but less than [sixteen] years of age; or . . . 
[e]ncourages, forces, or entices any person less than [sixteen] years 
of age to engage in sadomasochistic abuse, sexual bestiality, 
prostitution, or any other act involving sexual activity commits 
lewd or lascivious battery, a felony of the second degree . . . .
83
 
Therefore, a person under the age of sixteen in Florida is unable to consent to 
sexual activity, regardless of the age of the defendant.
84
 
C. The Effectiveness of Florida Statutes § 800.04 
Section 800.04 continues to be upheld because the State of Florida 
has determined that these laws are necessary to protect its youth, which is 
considered a compelling state interest.
85
  It is important to note, however, 
that these laws have not been known to be effective in preventing consenting 
teenagers from having sex with one another.
86
  The ineffectiveness of these 
laws at deterring teenagers from having sex puts the future of many high 
school students in doubt, as many of them will be required to register as sex 
                                                                    
80. See Oberman, supra note 16, at 25. 
81. FLA. STAT. § 800.04(2). 
82. Id. § 800.04(3). 
83. Id. § 800.04(4). 
84. See id. 
85. Amelio, supra note 17, at 422 (pointing out Florida’s compelling interest 
in protecting its youth). 
86. See Stine, supra note 15, at 1212–13 (explaining that very few teenagers 
who are sexually active are actually prosecuted). 
10
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offenders for the rest of their lives.
87
  The consequences of carrying such a 
label can be absolutely devastating.
88
 
V. CONSEQUENCES OF HAVING TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER 
The public strongly supports sex offender registration and 
notification laws because of the popular belief that having knowledge of 
where sex offenders live in a person’s community will help protect them or 
their children from future sex crimes.
89
  This view is not without merit, as 
some sex offenders may repeat past unlawful sexual acts, which would pose 
a serious risk to people in the community.
90
 
The Florida Sexual Predators Act—which aims to protect the 
community from sexual predators—enforces a number of requirements and 
prohibitions on registered sex offenders.
91
  The statute reasons that because 
of “[t]he high level of threat that a sexual predator presents to the public 
safety, and the long-term effects suffered by victims of sex offenses,” there is 
a significant state interest to monitor the release of sexual predators into the 
community, monitor the supervision of these sexual predators released into 
the community, enforce registration and notification laws, restrict certain 
employment opportunities for sex offenders, and create strict residency 
requirements.
92
  The legislature—despite their good intentions—even admits 
that “the cost of sexual offender victimization to society at large, while 
incalculable, [is] clearly exorbitant.”93 
Although there is surely a need to prevent these wrongful acts, the 
majority of research shows that the sex offender registration and notification 
laws have proven to be largely ineffective.
94
  Critics of such policies argue 
that “sex offender laws do not work, that is, they do not reduce sex offenses; 
. . . the stigmatizing and ostracizing effects of registration, notification, and 
residency restriction[s] may encourage the violent behavior they are aimed to 
deter.”95  This argument is sound, as these policies have been known to have 
                                                                    
87. Id. at 1214–15. 
88. Id. at 1215. 
89. Jill Levenson & Richard Tewksbury, Collateral Damage:  Family 
Members of Registered Sex Offenders, 34 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 54, 55 (2009). 
90. Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1134 (10th Cir. 2012). 
91. FLA. STAT. § 775.21(3)(b) (2013). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. § 775.21(3)(a). 
94. Levenson & Tewksbury, supra note 89, at 55. 
95. Joseph J. Fischel, Transcendent Homosexuals and Dangerous Sex 
Offenders:  Sexual Harm and Freedom in the Judicial Imaginary, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & 
POL’Y 277, 286 (2010) (explaining the ineffectiveness of statutory rape laws in regards to 
reducing sex offenses). 
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a significantly negative impact on the lives of both sexual offenders and their 
families.
96
 
A. Employment Opportunities 
As a result of the registration and notification laws required by the 
Florida Sexual Predators Act, up to half of all sex offenders experience a 
decrease in employment opportunities.
97
  This is troubling because studies 
have shown the “lack of stable employment” to be a central factor in sexual 
offenders repeating their past criminal behavior.
98
  Not only does the Florida 
Sexual Predators Act restrict sex offenders from working near places where 
children frequently visit, but these sex offenders “are also excluded from 
working in [such] fields . . . as law, real estate, medicine, nursing, physical 
therapy, and education.”99 
If that were not bad enough, when sex offenders are finally able to 
find jobs that they are not restricted from obtaining, employers are still 
reluctant to hire these individuals because of their criminal past.
100
  In fact, in 
“[a] survey of employers in five major” U.S. cities, two-thirds of the 
employers answered that they would never hire a sex offender.
101
  Sadly, the 
lack of employment opportunities has led many registered sex offenders to 
live a life of crime to support themselves and their families.
102
  This pattern 
just serves to reinforce the already unfavorable perception of sex 
offenders.
103
 
B. Residential Restrictions 
Most states require that sex offenders live a certain distance away 
from “schools, daycare centers, parks, [and school] bus stops.”104  The intent 
of these restrictions is to decrease the possibility that a sex offender could 
commit future sex crimes by diminishing his or her opportunities to commit 
such crimes again.
105
  To put into perspective the extreme inconvenience 
                                                                    
96. Levenson & Tewksbury, supra note 89, at 57. 
97. Id. at 55; see FLA. STAT. § 775.21(6), (7). 
98. James L. Johnson, Sex Offenders on Federal Community Supervision:  
Factors That Influence Revocation, 70 FED. PROBATION 18, 19 (2006). 
99. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 775.21(3)(b)(5). 
100. Johnson, supra note 98, at 19. 
101. Id. 
102. See id. at 20. 
103. See id. at 19–20. 
104. Levenson & Tewksbury, supra note 89, at 56. 
105. Stine, supra note 15, at 1183 (discussing the rationale behind residency 
restrictions). 
12
Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 7
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss1/7
2013] FLAWED “ROMEO AND JULIET” EXCEPTION 157 
these restrictions could cause a sex offender and his or her family, consider 
this:  In the city of Orlando, a whopping 95% of residential homes fall within 
1000 feet of a school, daycare center, school bus stop, or park, leaving only 
5% of the city available for them to live in.
106
 
Some states have even been known to enforce larger safety zones 
than are required by law.
107
  In Miami Beach, for example, sex offenders are 
prohibited from residing in homes within 2500 feet away from a school if the 
victim was under the age of sixteen.
108
  These strict policies prevent sex 
offenders from living stable lives, which have proven to be 
counterproductive in trying to reduce instances of recidivism.
109
 
Even when sex offenders are able to finally find a home to settle 
down in, in 20 to 40% of cases, the sex offender is forced to move out of his 
or her home at the request of his or her landlord or neighbors after they 
receive notification of their sex offender label.
110
  Not surprisingly, these 
residency restrictions have left a large number of registered “sex offenders 
homeless throughout the state [of Florida].”111 
C. Impact on the Family 
As stated earlier, classifying somebody as a sex offender not only 
has an adverse impact on the offender’s life, but on the lives of his or her 
loved ones as well.
112
  While residency restrictions are intended to keep sex 
offenders away from certain areas, they also indirectly prevent the spouses 
and children living with sex offenders—individuals who may not have been 
charged with sex crimes—from living in close proximity to these areas as 
well.
113
  As a result, the children of sex offenders are forced to live farther 
away from schools, which can be quite an inconvenience for the family.
114
 
As far as their social life is concerned, a survey of the family 
members of registered sex offenders revealed that 86% experienced stress in 
                                                                    
106. Levenson & Tewksbury, supra note 89, at 56. 
107. Kari White, Note, Where Will They Go? Sex Offender Residency 
Restrictions as Modern-Day Banishment, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 161, 170 (2008) 
(explaining that some states go above and beyond what statutory rape laws require in regards 
to residency restrictions for sex offenders). 
108. Id. 
109. Stine, supra note 15, at 1183 (arguing that strict residency restrictions 
prevent sex offenders from living stable lives, which could be the cause of some offenders 
repeating past criminal behavior). 
110. Levenson & Tewksbury, supra note 89, at 55–56. 
111. White, supra note 107, at 170 (explaining the serious consequences of 
being labeled a sex offender). 
112. Levenson & Tewksbury, supra note 89, at 57. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
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their lives, 77% felt isolated, and 49% had fear for their own safety.
115
  Half 
of the family members polled had lost friends as a result of their family 
member becoming a sex offender, and many who were polled admitted that 
being in a family with a registered sex offender kept them from participating 
in community events.
116
 
Unfortunately, the children of sex offenders suffer tremendous 
emotional strain from their parents’ label.117  More than half of the family 
members polled said that the children of sex offenders were treated badly by 
their classmates.
118
  Children of sex offenders are reported to feel increased 
“anger (80%), depression (77%), anxiety (73%), [loneliness] (65%), and fear 
[for their safety] (63%).”119  Perhaps the most disturbing fact of all is that 
“one in eight . . . children of [sex offenders] were reported to [experience] 
suicidal tendencies.”120  The statistics are clear:  Sexual registration 
requirements will have an extremely negative effect not only on the actual 
offender, but extend to the offender’s family as well.121 
D. The Lasting Effects of Registering as a Sex Offender 
In 2009, a Michigan appellate court held that forcing a “teenager 
[who was] convicted of [having] consensual [intercourse] with his below-
the-age-of-consent girlfriend” to register as a sex offender was considered 
cruel and unusual punishment.
122
  “Sex offender registration [could be 
considered a] modern day scarlet letter,” and as a result, the decision to 
classify a person as a sex offender should not be taken lightly.
123
  For this 
reason, some states—including Florida—have chosen to put Romeo and 
Juliet laws into place to protect consenting teenagers from having to register 
as sex offenders.
124
  These laws, however, are far from perfect. 
                                                                    
115. Id. at 57. 
116. Id. 
117. Levenson & Tewksbury, supra note 89, at 63–64. 
118. Id. at 63. 
119. Id. at 63–64. 
120. Id. at 64. 
121. Id. at 63–64. 
122. Stine, supra note 15, at 1188 (providing past constitutional challenges to 
sex offender laws). 
123. Catherine L. Carpenter, The Constitutionality of Strict Liability in Sex 
Offender Registration Laws, 86 B.U. L. REV. 295, 324 (2006) (describing the serious 
consequences of having to register as a sex offender). 
124. Id.; Stine, supra note 15, at 1184; see also FLA. STAT. § 943.04354 (2013). 
14
Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 7
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss1/7
2013] FLAWED “ROMEO AND JULIET” EXCEPTION 159 
VI. FLORIDA STATUTES § 943.04354THE ROMEO AND JULIET LAW 
A. Text of Florida’s Romeo and Juliet Law 
(1) For purposes of this section, a person shall be considered for 
removal of the requirement to register as a sexual offender or 
sexual predator only if the person: 
(a) Was or will be convicted or adjudicated delinquent of a 
violation of . . . [section] 800.04 . . . ; 
(b) Is required to register as a sexual offender or sexual predator 
solely on the basis of this violation; and 
(c) Is not more than [four] years older than the victim of this 
violation who was [fourteen] years of age or older but not more 
than [seventeen] years of age at the time the person committed this 
violation. 
(2) If a person meets the criteria in subsection (1) and the violation 
of . . . [section] 800.04 . . . was committed on or after July 1, 2007, 
the person may move the court that will sentence or dispose of this 
violation to remove the requirement that the person register as a 
sexual offender or sexual predator.  The person must allege in the 
motion that . . . [the] removal of the registration requirement will 
not conflict with federal law.  The state attorney must be given 
notice of the motion at least [twenty-one] days before the date of 
sentencing or disposition of this violation and may present 
evidence in opposition to the requested relief or may otherwise 
demonstrate why the motion should be denied.  At sentencing or 
disposition of this violation, the court shall rule on this motion and, 
if the court determines the person meets the criteria in subsection 
(1) and the removal of the registration requirement will not conflict 
with federal law, it may grant the motion and order the removal of 
the registration requirement.  If the court denies the motion, the 
person is not authorized under this section to petition for removal 
of the registration requirement.
125
 
 
B. Legal Authority Regarding Florida’s Romeo and Juliet Law 
Over the past decade, some states have implemented Romeo and 
Juliet laws, which absolve certain teenagers from having to register as sex 
                                                                    
125. FLA. STAT. § 943.04354(1)–(2). 
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offenders.
126
  These provisions were created to “impose lighter penalties 
when both parties are underage, while maintaining strict penalties for sex 
between an adult and a minor,” because some states believe that “sex 
between two young people is . . . less punishable than sex between a young 
person and an adult.”127 
An offender under section 800.04 of the Florida Statutes is 
automatically labeled a sex offender unless the offender satisfies three 
elements.
128
  First, the offender must be no “more than [four] years older 
than the victim.”129  Second, the offender must have been “required to 
register as a sex[] offender” solely for that offense.130  Third, the offender 
must have not been charged with multiple sex crimes.
131
 
If the offender were to satisfy all three of these elements, the 
offender would have the potential to take advantage of the Romeo and Juliet 
exception to remove the registration requirement.
132
  The following cases 
provide authority as to when and how the Romeo and Juliet law could be 
applied. 
1. Defendants Charged with Multiple Sex Crimes 
In Courson v. State,
133
 the Second District Court of Appeal held that 
the defendant—who was charged on two separate occasions under section 
800.04(4) of the Florida Statutes—did not qualify for the Romeo and Juliet 
exception because the law requires that an applicant not be charged with 
multiple sex crimes.
134
 
The defendant was found guilty of two separate charges of “lewd 
and lascivious battery of a victim over [twelve] but [fewer than sixteen] 
years of age.”135  “He was [then] sentenced to three years [in prison], 
followed by five years of probation, and [was labeled] a sex[] offender.”136  
The defendant tried to apply the Romeo and Juliet law to remove the 
requirement that he register as a sex offender, but his motion was denied by 
                                                                    
126. Stine, supra note 15, at 1184 (providing a brief history of Romeo and 
Juliet laws). 
127. Sabrina A. Perelman, Note, A Step in the Right Direction:  How Kansas v. 
Limon Indicates a Brighter Future for Gay Rights Under Lawrence v. Texas, 7 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 217, 240 (2006) (explaining the rationale behind Romeo and Juliet laws). 
128. FLA. STAT. §§ 800.04, 943.04354(1). 
129. Id. § 943.04354(1)(c). 
130. Id. § 943.04354(1)(b). 
131. Id. § 943.04354(1)(a). 
132. Id. § 943.04354(2). 
133. 24 So. 3d 1249 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
134. Id. at 125051; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 800.04(4), 943.04354(1)(a). 
135. Courson, 24 So. 3d at 1250. 
136. Id. 
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the trial court.
137
  The trial court agreed with the State, and the defendant 
appealed.
138
 
On appeal, the defendant argued that although the Romeo and Juliet 
law requires that the defendant not be convicted of more than one section 
800.04 crime, denying him usage of the Romeo and Juliet law would be to 
disregard the legislature’s true intent, which was to keep young lovers in 
consensual relationships from being branded as sex offenders for the rest of 
their lives.
139
  The State, on the other hand, argued that the plain language of 
the statute denied the defendant the right to take advantage of the Romeo and 
Juliet law.
140
 
The appellate court agreed that “[i]f the language is clear and 
unambiguous, there is no need to engage in statutory construction, and the 
statute should be given its plain and obvious meaning.”141  Therefore, 
because the statute clearly states that offenders with multiple sex crime 
convictions are not able to remove their sex offender registration 
requirement, the defendant was unable to take advantage of the Romeo and 
Juliet exception.
142
 
The appellate court’s holding was consistent with the express terms 
of the statute but contrary to the original legislative intent.
143
  Regardless, the 
court would not hold otherwise because to modify the statute’s express terms 
would be an abuse of the court’s power.144  In other words, its hands were 
tied. 
2. The Law’s Strict Age Limit 
In State v. Welch,
145
 the Second District Court of Appeal held that 
because the defendant was slightly more than four years older than his minor 
girlfriend when she became pregnant with his child, the defendant did not 
meet the elements required to use the Romeo and Juliet Statute to remove his 
sex offender registration requirement.
146
 
                                                                    
137. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 943.04354(1)–(2). 
138. Courson, 24 So. 3d at 1250. 
139. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 800.04, 943.04354(1)(a). 
140. Courson, 24 So. 3d at 1250. 
141. Id. at 1251 (citing Jackson Cnty. Hosp. Corp. v. Aldrich, 835 So. 2d 318, 
329 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002), review granted sub nom. Bay Anesthesia, Inc. v. Aldrich, 
847 So. 2d 975 (2003)). 
142. Id. at 1251; FLA. STAT. § 943.04354(1)(a). 
143. Courson, 24 So. 3d at 1251. 
144. Id. 
145. 94 So. 3d 631 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g denied, No. 2D11-2911, 
2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 15191 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
146. Id. at 634. 
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At the time the victim became pregnant with the defendant’s child, 
the victim was fourteen years old, and the defendant was eighteen years 
old.
147
  They were in a relationship with one another, and the defendant was 
aware of the victim’s younger age.148  The defendant, who was four years, 
two months, and twenty days older than his girlfriend, was charged with the 
“second-degree felony of lewd or lascivious battery on a female under 
sixteen years of age.”149  The defendant was adjudicated guilty, placed on 
probation for ten years, and labeled a sex offender.
150
 
After his probation, the defendant attempted to take advantage of the 
Romeo and Juliet law to remove this requirement to register as a sexual 
offender.
151
  The State opposed, arguing that although the sexual conduct 
between the victim and the defendant was consensual, the defendant did not 
meet the element of the statute that requires the defendant be no more than 
four years older than the victim at the time of the violation.
152
  Despite this 
argument, the trial court ruled in favor of the defendant, and reasoned that 
the ages at the time of the offense—eighteen and fourteen—could be 
considered a four-year difference.
153
  The trial court stated that its decision 
was ‘“equitable under the circumstances”’ because, in the last ten years, the 
defendant had completed his sex offender treatment, he had married another 
woman, and had been having unsupervised contact with the children from his 
marriage.
154
 
The State later appealed this ruling, and the case was brought to the 
appellate court.
155
  The higher court then reversed the lower court’s ruling, 
holding that the language, “‘“not more than [four] years older than the 
victim,”’”156 is clear, and that construction of its interpretation was not 
necessary.
157
  Therefore, the court had no choice but to hold that he did not 
meet the requirements of the Romeo and Juliet law because the defendant 
was more than four years older than the victim.
158
 
                                                                    
147. Id. at 633. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Welch, 94 So. 3d at 633. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Welch, 94 So. 3d at 633. 
156. Id. at 634 (quoting State v. Marcel, 67 So. 3d 1223, 1225 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. 
App. 2011)); FLA. STAT. § 943.04354 (2013). 
157. Welch, 94 So. 3d at 634 (quoting Marcel, 67 So. 3d at 1225). 
158. Id. 
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Erasing all doubt as to what the phrase not more than four years 
meant, the court in State v. Marcel
159
 held that “[i]f a defendant [was] one 
day [older than] the four-year . . . limit, . . . he [would be] ineligible to” use 
the Romeo and Juliet law to pardon his sex offender registration 
requirement.
160
  The defendant was charged with one count of lewd or 
lascivious battery of a person over the age of twelve but under the age of 
sixteen because he “was four years, three months, and eight days older than 
the victim.”161  The defendant was initially labeled a sex offender, but once 
the Romeo and Juliet law was enacted, the trial court granted relief to the 
defendant.
162
 
The State appealed, arguing that the defendant had not met the 
criteria required for the Romeo and Juliet law because he was more than four 
years older than the victim.
163
  The defendant disagreed and argued that 
completed years of life, not months and days, should be used when 
determining whether an offender is “not . . . more than four years older than 
[a] victim.”164  This interpretation, known as the birthday rule, would not 
consider a defendant to “be more than four years older than [a] victim until . . 
. [he] was five years older.”165 
The appellate court rejected this argument and explained that the 
Romeo and Juliet law requires an analysis of time and the birthday rule was 
only meant to calculate age.
166
  The court also reasoned that because the 
Romeo and Juliet law uses the word more—“commonly understood to mean 
greater”—the law’s language was clear as to whether or not the defendant 
was more than four years older than the victim.
167
  The court went even 
further, stating, “[i]f a defendant is one day past the four-year eligibility limit 
prescribed by section 943.04354 of the Florida Statutes, he is ineligible to 
petition for relief.”168  Therefore, because of the strict interpretation of the 
Romeo and Juliet law, the defendant was unable to petition for removal of 
his sex offender registration requirement.
169
 
                                                                    
159. 67 So. 3d 1223 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
160. Id. at 1225; see also FLA. STAT. § 943.04354(1)(c). 
161. Marcel, 67 So. 3d at 1224; see also FLA. STAT. § 800.04(4)(a). 
162. Marcel, 67 So. 3d at 1224. 
163. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 943.04354(1)(c). 
164. Marcel, 67 So. 3d at 1224. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 1225; see also FLA. STAT. § 943.04354(1)(c). 
168. Marcel, 67 So. 3d at 1225; see also FLA. STAT. § 943.04354(1)(c). 
169. Marcel, 67 So. 3d at 1225. 
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3. Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Romeo and Juliet Laws 
Unfortunately, not only are some statutory rape laws gender-biased, 
some are biased regarding sexual orientation as well.
170
  As shown in State v. 
Limon,
171
 the penalties in statutory rape cases can be much harsher for same-
sex couples than for heterosexual couples.
172
  In this case, the defendant had 
just turned eighteen years old when he participated in consensual oral sex 
with a fourteen-year-old.
173
  The defendant was less than four years older 
than the victim, so the defendant was young enough to take advantage of 
Kansas’ Romeo and Juliet law.174  Unfortunately for the defendant, however, 
Kansas’ Romeo and Juliet law did not provide protection for individuals in 
homosexual relationships.
175
  Therefore, because the defendant’s partner was 
of the same sex, he was unable to use the Romeo and Juliet law exception 
and was sentenced to seventeen years in prison.
176
 
The defendant appealed and the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the 
lower court’s decision.177  The court held that the discrimination of a same-
sex relationship in its Romeo and Juliet statute violated the Equal Protection 
Clause and, therefore, was unconstitutional.
178
  As a result, the defendant’s 
sentence was reduced from seventeen years in prison to one year in prison.
179
 
However, Kansas is not the only state that has discriminatory 
language against same-sex couples in its statutory rape laws.
180
  Currently, 
Texas prohibits homosexuals from taking advantage of its Romeo and Juliet 
statute.
181
  There has recently been a legislative push to include same-sex 
couples in this law, but as of today, homosexual teenagers in Texas cannot 
                                                                    
170. James, supra note 10, at 253 (providing an instance of discrimination in a 
Romeo and Juliet law). 
171. 122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005). 
172. James, supra note 10, at 253; Kate Sutherland, From Jailbird to Jailbait:  
Age of Consent Laws and the Construction of Teenage Sexualities, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN 
& L. 313, 327 (2003) (discussing the discrimination of same-sex couples in Romeo and Juliet 
laws). 
173. Limon, 122 P.3d at 24. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Sutherland, supra note 172, at 327. 
177. Limon, 122 P.3d at 41. 
178. Id. at 40; James, supra note 10, at 253. 
179. See James, supra note 10, at 253; Sutherland, supra note 172, at 327. 
180. See Jim Vertuno, Bills Would Add Gays to Texas’ ‘Romeo and Juliet’ 
Law, STAR-TELEGRAM (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.star-telegram.com/2013/04/08/4759215/
bills-would-add-gays-to-texas.html. 
181. Id. 
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use the Romeo and Juliet law to remove their sex offender registration 
requirement.
182
 
VII. OPINION 
A. Why Florida’s Statutory Rape Law Is Too Harsh on Otherwise 
Consenting Teenagers 
The purpose of this Comment is not to condone teenage sex; it is to 
bring to light that the consequences of section 800.04(4) of the Florida 
Statutes regarding consenting teenagers—which can be as severe as serving 
fifteen years in prison—are unintended consequences.183  Instead of 
providing real, effective ways to communicate to teenagers why abstaining 
from sexual activity at such a young age is a viable option, the statute seeks 
to imprison teenagers who have already engaged in sexual activity.
184
  This 
law does not deter consenting teenagers from engaging in sex, but merely 
punishes those who have already done so.
185
 
The Model Penal Code (“MPC”), a statutory text written by the 
American Law Institute, argues that teens close in age should not be held 
criminally liable for partaking in oral or vaginal sex.
186
  The American Law 
Institute reasons that because of the greater likelihood that teenagers would 
be otherwise consenting participants in sexual activity, criminal law should 
not target such activity.
187
  Additionally, the MPC states that criminal 
liability against only the older party of an otherwise consenting teenage 
relationship is unfair.
188
  Some states agree with this reasoning and have 
completely decriminalized sex amongst consenting teenagers altogether.
189
  
With a growing number of states implementing Romeo and Juliet laws, it is 
clear that states do not find such severe punishments against consenting 
                                                                    
182. Id. 
183. FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082(3)(c), 800.04(4) (2013). 
184. Id. § 800.04(4), (5)(b)(d), (6)(b)(c); see also id. § 775.082; Stine, supra 
note 15, at 1212–15. 
185. See FLA. STAT. § 800.04(4), (5)(b)(d), (6)(b)(c); Stine, supra note 15, at 
1212–15. 
186. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); Siji A. 
Moore, Note, Out of the Fire and into the Frying Pan:  Georgia Legislature’s Attempt to 
Regulate Teen Sex Through the Criminal Justice System, 52 HOW. L.J. 197, 224 (2008) 
(providing an argument posed by the MPC). 
187. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); Moore, 
supra note 186, at 224. 
188. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); Moore, 
supra note 186, at 224. 
189. Olsen, supra note 48, at 404 (discussing recent revisions of statutory rape 
laws). 
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teenagers to be just.
190
  Even these Romeo and Juliet exceptions, however, do 
not do enough to protect teenagers from the severe consequences of statutory 
rape laws.
191
 
B. Why Florida’s Romeo and Juliet Law Does Not Do Enough to 
Protect Otherwise Consenting Teenagers 
In the Welch case, Justice Morris, in his concurring opinion, 
discussed the injustice of the appellate court’s holding that the defendant—
who was four years and two months older than his girlfriend—would be 
unable to use the Romeo and Juliet exception to remove the requirement to 
register as a sex offender: 
This case profoundly illustrates the manifest injustice 
which can result when a statute has rigid criteria that prevents a 
trial judge from exercising reasonable discretion.  Judge Stargel, 
the trial judge in this case, attempted to exercise such discretion in 
the application of this statute.  The facts of this case cry out for the 
result he reached.  Regrettably, the requirements of the law do not 
permit us to support his decision. 
Is there a societal interest in prohibiting an eighteen-year-
old boyfriend and fourteen-year-old girlfriend from having 
consensual sexual relations?  The answer to that question is 
obvious; of course there is.  Mr. Welch should be punished for this 
behavior, and he was.  However, is it really the will of the people 
to label the eighteen-year-old in this situation a sex offender for 
life?  Is Mr. Welch who we really think of when we contemplate 
the definition of what a sex offender is or should be?  I doubt most 
people would include him in this category.
192
 
Although these Romeo and Juliet laws help protect most consenting 
teenagers, some teenagers continue to fall victim to the laws’ strict 
construction.
193
  These high school seniors, because they are more than four 
years older than their partners, end up receiving the same exact punishment 
as much older adult sex offenders.
194
 
                                                                    
190. Stine, supra note 15, at 1184; see also FLA. STAT. § 943.04354. 
191. See State v. Welch, 94 So. 3d 631, 634–35 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.) 
(Morris, J., concurring), reh’g denied, No. 2D11-2911, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 15191 (Fla. 2d 
Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
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We need to use a common sense approach here:  There is no 
substantive difference between a relationship in which an offender is 3 years 
and 364 days older than his or her partner and a relationship where an 
offender is four years and one day older than his or her partner.  Even if there 
were a substantive difference, it surely should not amount to enough of a 
difference that one party be labeled a sex offender, while the other party is 
not.  According to Florida’s statutory rape laws, however, this distinction is 
justifiable.
195
 
VIII. THE SOLUTION 
Kaitlyn is not a sexual predator who sought to take advantage of a 
younger girl.
196
  Kaitlyn is just a girl who had a crush on her friend.
197
  There 
is no doubt that when looking from the outside in, there seems to be a 
difference in maturity between an eighteen-year-old and a fourteen-year-
old.
198
  But who is to say that all teenagers act their own age?  When Kaitlyn 
was asked whether she thought it was wrong of her to be in a sexual 
relationship with her girlfriend because of their age difference, she responded 
“‘that she did not think about it because (redacted) acted older.’”199  Instead 
of sentencing teenagers like Kaitlyn to fifteen years in prison—a punishment 
that has not been shown to prevent consenting teens from beginning sexual 
relationships
200—we should lower the sentences for consenting teenagers and 
provide services to help both the offender and the victim understand the 
consequences and risks that come with entering into a sexual relationship.
201
 
If our true intent is to prevent teenagers from having sex at such an 
early age, there needs to be a more beneficial outcome than locking teenagers 
in prison for fifteen years and robbing many of them of promising futures.  It 
would not be surprising in the least if neither Kaitlyn nor her girlfriend knew 
that they were even breaking the law.
202
  This lack of effectiveness in 
deterring underage sex is the statute’s biggest flaw.203 
While Kaitlyn may still be able to apply the Romeo and Juliet statute 
to remove her sex offender registration requirement, she still faces up to 
                                                                    
195. See FLA. STAT. § 943.04354. 
196. See Barchenger, supra note 1. 
197. See id. 
198. See id. 
199. Id. 
200. Stine, supra note 15, at 1212–13 (explaining the ineffectiveness of rape 
laws in regards to consenting teenagers); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082, 800.04. 
201. See, e.g., Stine, supra note 15, at 1211–12, 1214–16, 1224–25. 
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fifteen years in prison.
204
  Not all teenagers charged with statutory rape will 
be as lucky—if you can call it that—as they may be slightly too old to use 
the Romeo and Juliet exception.
205
  Instead of using such a strict numbering 
system to determine whether a teenager should be labeled a sex offender, a 
totality of the circumstances approach should be implemented to determine 
so. 
Whether the teenagers were in the same high school, whether they 
shared the same friends, whether the older partner truly had good 
intentions—this is information that is important and should actually be 
weighed in the legal process.  The current Romeo and Juliet laws do not take 
these essential factors into account, and for that reason, the true intention of 
the Romeo and Juliet exception is not being realized.
206
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Since Kaitlyn was charged with lewd and lascivious battery of a 
minor, her case has received national media attention.
207
  Society can clearly 
see the wrong in Kaitlyn facing such a harsh punishment.
208
  And though she 
will likely escape her sex offender registration requirement,
209
 the teenagers 
who fall beyond the Romeo and Juliet law’s four-year limit will be provided 
no such legal protection.
210
  Until Florida makes a change, these unlucky 
teenagers will continue to be treated the same as the sexual predators that 
society and the legislature intended to label as sex offenders.
211
 
Labeling a teenager a sex offender is not a decision that should be 
dependent solely on something as insignificant as a birthday.  To the person 
who argues that a line needs to be drawn somewhere, I say, draw it 
somewhere else. 
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